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Secure quantum bit commitment against empty promises. II. The density matrix
Guang Ping He∗
School of Physics and Engineering, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China
We further study the security of the quantum bit commitment (QBC) protocol we previously
proposed [Phys. Rev. A 74, 022332 (2006).], by analyzing the reduced density matrix ρBb which
describes the quantum state at Bob’s side corresponding to Alice’s committed bit b. It is shown that
Alice will find ρB0 ⊥ ρ
B
1 while the protocol remains concealing to Bob. On the contrary, the existing
no-go theorem of unconditionally secure QBC is based on the condition ρB0 ≃ ρ
B
1 . Thus the specific
cheating strategy proposed in the no-go theorem does not necessarily applies to our protocol.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Mn, 89.70.+c
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum bit commitment (QBC) is a two-party cryp-
tography including two phases. In the commit phase,
Alice (the sender of the commitment) decides the value
of the bit b (b = 0 or 1) that she wants to commit, and
sends Bob (the receiver of the commitment) a piece of
evidence, e.g., some quantum states. Later, in the unveil
phase, Alice announces the value of b, and Bob checks it
with the evidence. An unconditionally secure QBC pro-
tocol needs to be both binding (i.e., Alice cannot change
the value of b after the commit phase) and concealing
(Bob cannot know b before the unveil phase) without re-
lying on any computational assumption.
It is widely accepted that unconditionally secure QBC
is impossible [1]-[24], despite of some attempts towards
secure ones (a detailed list and brief history can be found
in the introduction of [25]). This result, known as the
Mayers-Lo-Chau (MLC) no-go theorem, was considered
as putting a serious drawback on quantum cryptography.
Nevertheless, we must note that the correctness of the
conclusion a theorem should not be confused with that of
its proof. While a correct proof will surely lead to a cor-
rect conclusion, there could also be cases where someone
may draw a correct conclusion despite that the existing
proof is not sufficiently general. In quantum cryptogra-
phy, though there are brilliant proofs (e.g., [26]) for the
security of quantum key distribution, for other crypto-
graphic tasks it could be hard to find a general proof
showing that a protocol is unconditionally secure, since
there could potentially exist numerous cheating strate-
gies. Similarly, it is also hard to find a real general proof
showing that a cryptographic task can never be accom-
plished securely (unless the definition of the task contains
self-inconsistent goals), because the protocols potentially
existed could also be numerous, some of which may even
beyond our current imagination. As for QBC, it is im-
portant to notice that all the existing no-go proofs [1]-
[24] are actually based on a specific cheating strategy of
Alice, as it will be summarized below. No matter un-
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conditionally secure QBC is possible or not, we could
question whether this specific cheating strategy can be
evaded. If there is a protocol which is secure against the
specific cheating strategy in the no-go proofs while inse-
cure against other cheating strategies, then it reveals that
the existing proofs of the MLC no-go theorem should not
be considered sufficiently general, despite that the con-
clusion of the theorem may remain valid.
In our previous work [27], we proposed a QBC protocol
and proved that it is secure against some known attacks,
while an attack strategy that can break our protocol suc-
cessfully has yet to be found. Thus the exact boundary
of the security of the protocol remains unclear. In this
paper, we will further show that the density matrix in
the protocol displays a distinct feature comparing with
that of the QBC model studied in existing no-go proofs
[1]-[24]. This makes it possible for our protocol to evade
at least the specific cheating strategy that led to these
proofs.
In the next section, we will briefly review the existing
no-go proofs of QBC, and pinpoint out that the cheating
strategies in all these proofs have the same requirement
on the density matrix. Our previous QBC protocol [27]
will be illustrated in section III. Then in section IV, we
will analyze the density matrix in this protocol, and show
that they does not satisfy a requirement on which the
no-go proofs hold. In section V, we will elaborate why
security can maintain in the absence of this requirement.
II. THE DENSITY MATRIX IN THE NO-GO
PROOFS
Although there are many no-go proofs [1]-[24], they all
have the following common features.
(1) The reduced model. According to the no-go proofs,
any QBC protocol can be reduced to the following model.
Alice and Bob together own a quantum state in a given
Hilbert space. Each of them performs unitary transfor-
mations on the state in turns. All measurements are
performed at the very end.
(2) The coding method. The quantum state corre-
2sponding to the committed bit b has the form
|ψb〉 =
∑
j
λ
(b)
j
∣∣∣e(b)j
〉
A
⊗
∣∣∣f (b)j
〉
B
, (1)
and it is known to both Alice and Bob. Here the systems
A and B are owned by Alice and Bob respectively.
(3) The concealing condition. To ensure that Bob’s in-
formation on the committed bit is trivial before the un-
veil phase, any QBC protocol secure against Bob should
satisfy
ρB0 ≃ ρB1 , (2)
where ρBb = TrA |ψb〉 〈ψb| is the reduced density matrix
of the state at Bob’s side corresponding to Alice’s com-
mitted bit b.
(4) The cheating strategy. Once Eq. (2) is satisfied,
according to the Hughston-Jozsa-Wootters (HJW) theo-
rem (which also appeared in many different names in lit-
erature, e.g., the Uhlmann theorem, etc.) [29–32], there
exists a local unitary transformation for Alice to map
{
∣∣∣e(0)j
〉
A
} into {
∣∣∣e(1)j
〉
A
} successfully with a high prob-
ability. Thus a dishonest Alice can unveil the state as
either |ψ0〉 or |ψ1〉 at her will with a high probability
to escape Bob’s detection. For this reason, a concealing
QBC protocol cannot be binding.
The most important point for our discussion here is
feature (3). We would like to emphasize again that it
appears in all existing no-go proofs. Note that in some
references (e.g. [10, 19, 22, 24]), this feature was ex-
pressed using the trace distance or the fidelity instead of
the reduced density matrices, while the meaning remains
the same. On the other hand, it will be shown below
that the density matrix in our previous QBC protocol
[27] displays an intriguing feature. Though the protocol
remains concealing against Bob, at Alice’s point of view
there will be ρB0 ⊥ ρB1 (i.e., they are orthogonal) instead
of ρB0 ≃ ρB1 . As Eq. (2) is necessary for constructing Al-
ice’s cheating transformation in the above feature (4), our
protocol is thus immune to this specific cheating strategy.
III. OUR PROTOCOL
A. The rigorous description
In Ref. [27], we proposed the following QBC protocol.
The commit protocol: [commit(b)]
(C1) Alice and Bob first agree on a security parameter
s, then DOsi=1 Alice picks θi ∈ (0, pi/2) (θi needs not
to be different for each i. For example, Alice can fix
θi = pi/4 throughout the whole protocol) and randomly
picks qi ∈ {0, 1}, and prepares an entangled state
|ψi〉 = |αi ⊗ βi〉 = cos θi |x〉α⊗|0, qi〉β+sin θi |y〉α⊗|1, qi〉β .
(3)
Then she sends the quantum register βi to Bob and stores
αi. Here |x〉α and |y〉α are two orthogonal states of the
quantum register αi, while we use |pi, qi〉β to denote the
state of βi, with pi denoting the basis and qi labelling the
different states in the same basis. The state |0, 0〉 and
|0, 1〉 are orthogonal to each other, and |1, 0〉 ≡ (|0, 0〉+
|0, 1〉)/√2, |1, 1〉 ≡ (|0, 0〉 − |0, 1〉)/√2;
(C2) Bob chooses a number s′ (0 ≤ s′ < s) and ran-
domly divides S ≡ {1, ..., s} into two subsets S′ and S′′
such that |S′| = s′, S′′ = S − S′. Then for ∀i ∈ S′ Bob
stores βi unmeasured. And for ∀i ∈ S′′ Bob randomly
picks a basis p′i ∈ {0, 1} and measures βi. The outcome
is denoted as |p′i, q′i〉β ;
(C3) Bob chooses fa, fb, fc (fa+fc < 1/2 and fb > fc)
and announces to Alice the “fake” result {|p′′i , q′′i 〉β |i ∈
S} such that fa = (|La| + s′/4)/s, fb = (|Lb| + s′/4)/s
and fc = (|Lc|+s′/4)/s, where La = {i ∈ S′′| |p′′i , q′′i 〉β =
|p′i, qq′i〉β}, Lb = {i ∈ S′′| |p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |qp′i, q′i〉β}, and
Lc = {i ∈ S′′| |p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |qp′i, qq′i〉β};
(C4) Alice divides S into two subsets: M = {i ∈
S|q′′i =qqi} and U = {i ∈ S|q′′i = qi}. For ∀i ∈ M ,
she measures αi in the basis (|x〉α , |y〉α). She sets pi = 0
if she finds |x〉α or pi = 1 if she finds |y〉α. Then she sets
L = {i ∈ M |pi = p′′i } and announces it to Bob; (Since it
could be shown that |M | ≃ [1/4+(fa+fc)/2]s, by check-
ing whether |M | < s/2 Alice can test whether Bob has
indeed chosen fa + fc < 1/2. Also, since |L| ≃ (fa/2 +
fb/4 + fc/4)s, we have |M | − |L| ≃ [1/4− (fb − fc)/4]s.
Thus by checking whether |M |− |L| < s/4 Alice can test
whether Bob has indeed chosen fb > fc.)
(C5) Bob sets Ls′ = L∩S′. Then he measures βi (∀i ∈
Ls′) in the basis p
′
i = p
′′
i and denotes the outcome as
|p′i, q′i〉β . He agrees to continue only if {i ∈ Ls′ | |p′i, q′i〉β =
|p′′i , q′′i 〉β} = φ, L ⊂ La ∪ Lb ∪ Lc ∪ S′ and |L| ≃ (fa/2 +
fb/4 + fc/4)s;
(C6) Alice sets c0i = 0 if i ∈ U or c0i = 1 if i ∈M − L.
Thus she obtains a binary string c0 = (c01c
0
2...c
0
n) (n ≡
|S − L|);
(C7) Alice and Bob complete the commitment with the
codeword method similar to that of the BCJL protocol
[33] by using c0 to encode the codeword (c0 itself is not
announced to Bob). That is:
(C7.1) Bob chooses a binary linear (n, k, d)-code
C and announces it to Alice, where the ratios d/n and
k/n are agreed on by both Alice and Bob;
(C7.2) Alice chooses a nonzero random n-bit
string r = (r1r2...rn) ∈ {0, 1}n and announces it to Bob;
(C7.3) Now Alice has in mind the value of the bit
b that she wants to commit. Then she chooses a random
n-bit codeword c = (c1c2...cn) from C such that c⊙r = b
(Here c⊙ r ≡
n⊕
i=1
ci ∧ ri);
(C7.4) Alice announces to Bob c′ = c⊕ c0.
The unveil protocol: [unveil(b, c, c0, |ψi〉)]
(U1) Alice announces b, c, c0, {qi, θi| i ∈ S} and {pi|i ∈
M} to Bob;
3(U2) Alice sends the quantum registers {αi|i ∈ U} to
Bob;
(U3) Bob finishes the measurement on {αi|i ∈ U} and
{βi|i ∈ S′} to check Alice’s announcement;
(U4) Bob checks |M | ≃ [1/4+ (fa + fc)/2]s and (M −
L) ∩ Lb = φ;
(U5) Bob checks b = c⊙ r and (c is a codeword).
B. Notes
Since it is an important theoretical problem whether
secure QBC exists, here the feasibility of the protocol
is not what we care of. Thus we do not consider the
presence of detection error, channel noise, or any other
implementation issue.
In Ref. [27] we used to require Bob to choose 0 < fa,
fb, fc < 1/4 in step (C3). The purpose is to prevent Bob
from delaying his measurement too often, because if he
announces the “fake” result |p′′i , q′′i 〉β (i ∈ S) before he
actually performs the measurement and obtains the real
outcome |p′i, q′i〉β , then there will be no specific relation-
ship between |p′′i , q′′i 〉β and |p′i, q′i〉β, which is equivalent
to choosing fa = fb = fc = 1/4. By the time Ref. [27]
was written we did not know whether Bob will be bene-
fited if he delays the measurement, so we introduced the
requirement 0 < fa, fb, fc < 1/4. But now we know that
Bob cannot cheat even if the measurement was delayed,
as it will be elaborated later in this paper. Thus we can
remove this requirement from now on.
C. An easy understanding
As the no-go proofs has been widely accepted for more
than a decade and a half, if there is a loophole, it must
be lying somewhere subtle. Thus it is not surprising that
a counter-example would look very complicated. To fully
understand how the above protocol works, it is strongly
recommend to read Ref. [27] in detail. For easier com-
prehension, some main ideas will be outlined below. But
for any security debate in the future, it is important to
always get back to the above rigorous mathematical de-
scription, as the security of a protocol will depend heavily
on its details.
The main part of the above commit protocol is to force
Alice to accomplish a lie-detecting task. That is, Alice
sends Bob s quantum registers βi (i = 1, ..., s) in step
(C1). Bob measures them in (C2) and announces the
results in (C3). But it is important to note that the
protocol allows Bob to lie when announcing the results.
Then in (C4), Alice is required to detect Bob’s lies and
announces the label i whenever she finds that Bob’s an-
nounced result for βi is a lie. The total number of lies
she is required to detect is
l ≡ |L| ≃ (fa/2 + fb/4 + fc/4)s. (4)
Here fa, fb, and fc are the lying frequencies with which
Bob announces different types of lies. A type a lie means
that Bob announces his actual measurement basis p′i
honestly as p′′i , while lies about the state he found in
this basis. That is, when his actual measurement re-
sult is |p′i, q′i〉β , he takes |p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |p′i, qq′i〉β and an-
nounces |p′′i , q′′i 〉β . On the contrary, a type b lie means
that Bob lies about the basis, while announcing q′i hon-
estly, i.e., the actual result |p′i, q′i〉β is announced as
|p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |qp′i, q′i〉β instead. A type c lie means that Bob
lies about both the basis p′i and the state q
′
i, i.e., the ac-
tual result |p′i, q′i〉β is announced as |p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |qp′i, qq′i〉β
instead. Note that if a “fake” result |p′′i , q′′i 〉β Bob an-
nounced is not a lie at all, it will be called an honest
result when we need to distinguish it from other lies.
But in general, for simplicity we will still call everything
(either lies or honest ones) denoted by |p′′i , q′′i 〉β as fake
results.
The commit protocol not only require Alice to detect l
lies, but also force her to use the optimal strategy. Here
“optimal” means that while the total number of detected
lies must reach l, Alice should try her best to keep the
number of the unmeasured quantum registers αi as large
as possible, so that most αi ⊗ βi pairs remain entangled
[34], while only a small portion of them was measured and
collapsed into non-entangled product states. As shown
in Ref. [27], when fa+fc < 1/2 and fb > fc, the optimal
strategy for Alice is to prepare the initial states of αi⊗βi
in a non-maximally entangled form as Eq. (3). Then to
detect l lies, the number of αi she needs to measure is as
small as
m ≡ |M | ≃ [1/4 + (fa + fc)/2]s. (5)
Therefore, after l lies were detected and the correspond-
ing quantum registers were discarded, the remaining
n = s− l pairs of quantum registers contain m− l pairs
of measured ones, while the rest n−(m− l) = s−m pairs
remain entangled from Alice’s point of view as she has
not measured the corresponding αi. By assigning a “0”
to each of the unmeasured ones and “1” to each of the
measured ones, respectively, Alice obtains an n-bit string
c0 in step (C6). As it is a basic law that entanglement
cannot be created locally, Alice cannot change the “1” to
“0” in c0 freely. Step (C7) further connects c0 with Al-
ice’s commit bit b. Thus Alice is forced to commit once
she accomplishes the lie-detecting task.
IV. THE DENSITY MATRIX IN OUR
PROTOCOL
A. Important hints
When calculating the density matrix ρBb , two things
should be kept in mind.
(i) We only need to study the value when the partic-
ipants act honestly. This may look weird at the first
4glance. But we should note that the conclusion of the
no-go proofs is: if ρB0 ≃ ρB1 is satisfied when both par-
ticipants execute the protocol honestly, then Alice can
cheat. That is, the density matrix ρBb studied in the no-
go proofs is the one that describes the state obtained in
the honest protocol, before taking cheating into consid-
eration. In fact, even if Alice cheats, ρBb should remain
unchanged. Otherwise Bob can simply perform a mea-
surement to distinguish the density matrices, thus reveal
Alice’s cheating. On the other hand, suppose that Bob
cheats by introducing ancillary systems and/or perform-
ing transformations to alter ρBb . Then we can always
treat all these ancillary systems and transformations as
a part of his operations on distinguishing ρBb , instead of
a part of ρBb itself. Therefore, no cheating of either par-
ticipant need to be considered when calculating ρBb .
(ii) ρBb should not only describe the quantum system
Alice sent to Bob (e.g., the registers βi’s in our protocol),
but also reflect the influence of classical communication.
The latter includes the classical information Alice an-
nounces to Bob, as well as what Bob announces to Alice
while she accepts without questioning (i.e., Bob can as-
sume by default that his classical information has reached
Alice successfully so that she knows the content). This is
because the original MLC no-go theorem worked on a sce-
nario without involving classical communication directly.
But it is by no means indicating that classical commu-
nication can be simply ignored. Instead, they used an
“indirect” approach (as named in Ref. [7]). That is, they
treated classical communication as a special case of quan-
tum communication, and replaced them with a quantum
channel [6]. Consequently, any protocol using classical
information are replaced with a full quantum protocol
without classical information. As pinpointed out in sec-
tion 2 of Ref. [7], the advantage is that the attack on the
new protocol is easy to describe, while the disadvantage
is that the attack obtained against the new protocol is
not the one that applies on the original protocol. There-
fore, to make our presentation consistent with the above
description of our QBC protocol (which includes classical
communication) so that it could be easier for the reader
to understand, here we avoid using the indirect approach,
and calculate ρBb with classical communication taken into
account in its original form.
B. The constraint from |pi, qi〉β
With the above considerations, let us study the quan-
tum states at the end of our commit protocol. The in-
formations corresponding to the quantum registers βi’s
(i ∈ L) were already detected as lies in step (C4) and
were publicly known to both participants, so that they
are no longer useful and can be discarded. Thus we are
interested in the remaining βi’s (i ∈ S−L) at Bob’s side.
To each of them, Alice has assigned a bit c0i in step (C6).
Since Alice has not announced Bob’s corresponding fake
result |p′′i , q′′i 〉β as a lie, it indicates two possibilities by
default.
(a) c0i = 1, i.e., Alice has measured the corresponding
αi in step (C4) but detected no lie.
(b) c0i = 0, i.e., Alice has chosen not to measure αi in
step (C4).
In step (C4) Alice measures all αi’s that satisfy q
′′
i =
qqi, and announces these satisfying pi = p
′′
i as lies.
Therefore according to Eq. (3), in case (a) Alice’s mea-
surement will collapse |ψi〉 = |αi ⊗ βi〉 into
|ψi〉 →
{ |x〉α ⊗ |qp′′i , qq′′i 〉β , (p′′i = 1)
|y〉α ⊗ |qp′′i , qq′′i 〉β , (p′′i = 0)
(6)
In case (b), |ψi〉 can be written as
|ψi〉 = cos θi |x〉α ⊗ |0, q′′i 〉β + sin θi |y〉α ⊗ |1, q′′i 〉β . (7)
But these are merely the forms of the states under
the constraint of the relationship between the values of
|p′′i , q′′i 〉β and |pi, qi〉β . We must further consider the con-
straints brought by the relationship between |p′′i , q′′i 〉β and
Bob’s actual measurement result.
C. Type a lies
Suppose that Bob’s fake result |p′′i , q′′i 〉β turns out to
be a type a lie, i.e., Bob’s actual result is |p′i, q′i〉β =
|p′′i , qq′′i 〉β . Then we can see that from Alice’s point of
view, in case (b) among the two components in the su-
perposition in Eq. (7), the one corresponding to |p′′i , q′′i 〉β
will conflict with Bob’s actual result as they are orthog-
onal. Therefore, though c0i = 0 means that Alice should
keep the entangled state Eq. (7) unmeasured, this com-
ponent must vanish when Bob’s measurement makes the
state collapse. So the only component that takes effect
should be |x〉α⊗|qp′′i , q′′i 〉β (if p′′i = 1) or |y〉α⊗|qp′′i , q′′i 〉β
(if p′′i = 0). That is, if Alice wants to take c
0
i = 0, then
from her point of view (as she does not know Bob’s actual
result |p′i, q′i〉β), the state of the corresponding βi she sent
to Bob has to take the form |qp′′i , q′′i 〉β at the end of the
commit phase. On the other hand, as we showed above,
in case (a) (i.e., if Alice wants to take c0i = 1) the state
of βi should be |qp′′i , qq′′i 〉β . In brief, when there is a type
a lie, the two states of βi corresponding to c
0
i = 0 and
c0i = 1, respectively, are orthogonal to each other.
Some might wonder why the state at Bob’s side is not
simply Bob’s actual result |p′i, q′i〉β itself. This is because,
as we mentioned in the above point (ii), the classical in-
formation exchanged in the protocol should also be taken
into consideration. That is, the state at Bob’s side that
Alice can unveil successfully later must show no conflict
not only with Bob’s actual result |p′i, q′i〉β, but also with
the type of lies that Bob’s announced fake result |p′′i , q′′i 〉β
belongs to, i.e., it should explain why Alice has not de-
tected this lie. If in the unveil phase Alice said that the
state she sent was |pi, qi〉β = |p′′i , qq′′i 〉β , then in the case
of type a lies, it equals exactly to Bob’s actual result
5|p′i, q′i〉β . But it will conflict with |p′′i , qq′′i 〉β, because if
there is qi =qq
′′
i , in step (C4) Alice should have catego-
rized it into the measured set M . Then as there is also
pi = p
′′
i , she should have announced it as a detected lie in
set L, which should be discarded in later steps without
being assigned a c0i value at all. Thus we see that Bob’s
actual result |p′i, q′i〉β cannot be taken as the state encod-
ing Alice’s committed codeword. Instead, as shown in the
previous paragraph, the state |qp′′i , q′′i 〉β (or |qp′′i , qq′′i 〉β)
will not conflict with Bob’s actual result |p′i, q′i〉β , because
they are nonorthogonal so that Bob’s measurement can
indeed find the result |p′i, q′i〉β with a nonvanishing prob-
ability. Meanwhile, it also agrees with the fact that in
step (C4) Alice chose not to measure the state (or she
measured but did not detect it as a lie). Therefore, it is
the correct state at Bob’s side at the end of the commit
phase that corresponds to c0i = 0 (or c
0
i = 1).
D. Type b lies
Now suppose that Bob’s fake result |p′′i , q′′i 〉β is a type b
lie, i.e., Bob’s actual result is |p′i, q′i〉β = |qp′′i , q′′i 〉β. Since
in step (C4) Alice only measures the αi’s that satisfy
q′′i =qqi, for a measured αi there will be q
′′
i = q
′
i =qqi.
Rewriting Eq. (3) as
|ψi〉 = [cos θi |x〉α + (−1)qi
sin θi√
2
|y〉α]⊗ |0, qi〉β
+
sin θi√
2
|y〉α ⊗ |0, qqi〉β
=
cos θi√
2
|x〉α ⊗ |1, qqi〉β
+[(−1)qi cos θi√
2
|x〉α + sin θi |y〉α]⊗ |1, qi〉β .(8)
we can see that in the current case, Bob’s measurement
in the p′i basis collapses |ψi〉 into either |x〉α⊗|1, qqi〉β (if
p′i =qp
′′
i = 1) or |y〉α ⊗ |0, qqi〉β (if p′i =qp′′i = 0). When
Alice measures this αi in step (C4), her result will always
be pi = p
′′
i so that she would detect it as a lie. That is,
all the type b lies in set M will be detected. After Alice
announced set L in step (C4), there will be no more type
b lie left in the set M − L. (This is why Bob needs to
check (M − L) ∩ Lb = φ in step (U4).) Therefore at
the end of the commit phase, for any βi corresponding
to a bit in the string c0 = (c01c
0
2...c
0
n), Bob’s fake result
must not be a type b lie if c0i = 1. Any type b lie has to
indicate c0i = 0. In other words, for a specific i if Bob’s
fake result is a type b lie, then the βi at Bob’s side at
this stage has to be in the state corresponding to c0i = 0.
There does not exist any legitimate state of βi that can
be later unveiled as c0i = 1. In this sense, the states of
βi corresponding to c
0
i = 0 and c
0
i = 1, respectively, are
also orthogonal to each other when there is a type b lie.
The state of βi corresponding to c
0
i = 0 in this case
can be a mixture of |p′′i , q′′i 〉β and |qp′′i , q′′i 〉β , as none of
TABLE I: The state of βi corresponding to different values of
c0i and the type of lies that the fake result |p
′′
i , q
′′
i 〉β belongs
to. See section IV for details.
|p′′i , q
′′
i 〉β βi(c
0
i = 0) βi(c
0
i = 1)
Type a lie |qp′′i , q
′′
i 〉β |qp
′′
i , qq
′′
i 〉β
Type b lie Mixture of Not available
|p′′i , q
′′
i 〉β and |qp
′′
i , q
′′
i 〉β
Type c lie |p′′i , q
′′
i 〉β |qp
′′
i , qq
′′
i 〉β
Honest result Mixture of |qp′′i , qq
′′
i 〉β
|p′′i , q
′′
i 〉β and |qp
′′
i , q
′′
i 〉β
these components in Eq. (7) conflicts with Bob’s actual
result |p′i, q′i〉β = |qp′′i , q′′i 〉β .
E. Type c lies
The above results on types a and b lies are already
sufficient for our discussion on ρBb in this section. But
for completeness, we further study the type c lie, i.e.,
Bob’s actual result is |p′i, q′i〉β = |qp′′i , qq′′i 〉β . Then from
Alice’s point of view, in the above case (b) among the
two components in the superposition in Eq. (7), the one
corresponding to |qp′′i , q′′i 〉β will conflict with Bob’s actual
result. Therefore the only component that takes effect
should be |x〉α ⊗ |p′′i , q′′i 〉β (if p′′i = 0) or |y〉α ⊗ |p′′i , q′′i 〉β
(if p′′i = 1). That is, if Alice wants to take c
0
i = 0, then
the state of βi should take the form |p′′i , q′′i 〉β at the end of
the commit phase. On the other hand, as showed above
in case (a), if Alice wants to take c0i = 1, the state of βi
should be |qp′′i , qq′′i 〉β. Thus we see that, unlike types a
and b lies, when there is a type c lie, the two states of
βi corresponding to c
0
i = 0 and c
0
i = 1, respectively, are
nonorthogonal to each other.
F. Honest results
Similarly, it can be shown that if Bob announced
|p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |p′i, q′i〉β as an honest result without lying,
then the state of βi corresponding to c
0
i = 0 can be a
mixture of |p′′i , q′′i 〉β and |qp′′i , q′′i 〉β , like that of the type
b lies. Meanwhile, there exists a legitimate state corre-
sponding to c0i = 1, which is |qp′′i , qq′′i 〉β , like those of the
types a and c lies. Again, the two states are nonorthog-
onal.
For explicitness, we briefly summarized the above re-
sults in Table I.
6G. Bob’s required d
The above discussion is about the state of a single βi.
Now let us turn to the entire systemB ≡⊗
i
βi (i ∈ S−L)
corresponding to the density matrix ρBb . Note that all the
βi’s in B are not completely independent from each other.
Together they should represent a codeword. In brief, the
binary linear (n, k, d)-code C is a set of classical n-bit
strings. It contains about 2k strings in total. Each string
is called a codeword, carefully selected from all the 2n
possible choices of n-bit strings, so that the distance (i.e.,
the number of different bits) between any two codewords
is not less than d. Let |B(c)〉 ≡ ⊗
i
∣∣βi(c0i )〉 denote the
state of system B at the end of the commit phase that
corresponds to a specific codeword c, i.e., the relationship
c′ = c⊕ c0 is satisfied, where c0 = (c01c02...c0n) is the string
that the state |B(c)〉 represents according to the coding
method in step (C6), and c′ is what Alice announces in
step (C7.4). Let |B(c∗)〉 ≡ ⊗
i
∣∣βi(c0∗i )〉 denote such a
state of system B that corresponds to another codeword
c∗, with c′ = c∗ ⊕ c0∗. Note that c and c∗ have at least d
different bits. According to the analysis above, if Bob’s
fake result on one of these d bits (denote it as the ı˜-th
bit) is a type a or b lie, the states
∣∣βı˜(c0ı˜ )〉 and ∣∣βı˜(c0∗ı˜ )〉
are orthogonal to each other since c0ı˜ 6= c0∗ı˜ . In this case
〈B(c) |B(c∗)〉 = 0 will be rigorously satisfied regardless
the state of other βi’s (i 6= ı˜).
It is easy to ensure that the d different bits between
any two codewords contain at least one bit which is cor-
responding to a type a or b lie. According to step (C3) of
our protocol, the numbers of the types a, b and c lies are
about fas, fbs and fcs, respectively. Eq. (4) shows that
the numbers of each type of the lies that Alice detected in
step (C4) are about fas/2, fbs/4 and fcs/4, respectively.
Therefore after the commit phase, the numbers of these
three types of lies that remain undetected are about
l′a ≃ fas/2, l′b ≃ 3fbs/4, l′c ≃ 3fcs/4. (9)
Meanwhile, the total number of honest results are about
h ≃ (1− fa − fb − fc)s. (10)
Note that the above numbers are all evaluated statisti-
cally. Some fluctuation around these statistical values
must be allowed. But the tolerable range of fluctua-
tion (that can ensure the protocol work properly with
a very high probability) can be estimated using classical
statistical theory, so we are not going into detail here.
Obviously, the above numbers satisfy the following rela-
tionship regardless of statistical fluctuation
l′a + l
′
b + l
′
c + h = n. (11)
Given that Bob’s choice of the type of lies is fixed for
each and every βi (i ∈ S−L), then if d is larger than the
total numbers of honest results (i.e., h) and the type c lies
left undetected (i.e., l′c), and the difference is significantly
larger than the tolerable range of statistical fluctuation,
we can be sure that among the d different bits between
any two codewords, there is at least one bit that corre-
sponding to a type a or b lie. Therefore, in step (C7.1)
Bob tends to accept a value of d that satisfies
d > dmin ≡ h+ l′c ≃ (1− fa − fb − fc/4)s. (12)
With this d, 〈B(c) |B(c∗)〉 = 0 will always be satisfied
for any two codewords c and c∗. Thus the two Hilbert
spacesH0 andH1 are rigorously orthogonal to each other,
where Hb (b = 0, 1) denotes the space supported by all
the states |B(c)〉’s that corresponding to those codewords
c’s which can unveil the value of the committed bit as
b successfully, i.e., {c ∈ C|c ⊙ r = b}. Using λc to
denote the probability for a codeword c to be chosen
when Alice’s committed value is b (b = 0, 1), we have
ρBb =
∑
c∈C|c⊙r=b λc |B(c)〉 〈B(c)|. Then we reach one of
the main conclusion of the current paper, that there will
be ρB0 ⊥ ρB1 as long as d satisfies Eq. (12). In this case,
Alice cannot cheat using the specific strategy proposed
in the existing no-go theorem of QBC, because it has to
rely on the condition ρB0 ≃ ρB1 .
V. SECURITY AGAINST BOB’S CHEATING
A. Bob’s dilemma: which basis to measure
It remains to show that our protocol is still conceal-
ing even though ρB0 ⊥ ρB1 . At the first glance it seems
impossible, because Bob can simple perform a collective
measurement that distinguishes ρB0 from ρ
B
1 and learn the
committed bit b. More rigorously, Bob finds out all the
codewords c ∈ C that satisfy c ⊙ r = 0, then constructs
the projection operator
P0 ≡
∑
c∈C|c⊙r=0
|B(c)〉 〈B(c)| , (13)
and applies it on his quantum system B =
⊗
i
βi (i ∈ S−
L) after the commit phase. If the projection is successful,
he knows that b = 0. Else if the projection fails, he knows
that b = 1.
However, we must note that ρB0 ⊥ ρB1 is conditional. It
requires Eq. (12), which is derived under the assumption
that Bob’s choice of the type of lies for every βi (i ∈ S−L)
is already fixed. To calculate the operator P0 in Eq. (13),
Bob must know the form of the state |B(c)〉 =⊗
i
∣∣βi(c0i )〉
corresponding to each codewords c satisfying c ⊙ r =
0. According to Table I,
∣∣βi(c0i )〉 has different forms for
different types of lies. Without knowing the choice of the
type of lies for each βi, P0 cannot be obtained.
On the other hand, suppose that Bob tries to calculate
P0 without fixing the type of lies. That is, he exhausts all
possible combinations of the types of lies, finds the form
of |B(c)〉 corresponding to each of these combinations,
7and includes all these |B(c)〉’s into the sum in Eq. (13).
Then the resultant P0 will be useless for the reason below.
As the choice of the type of lies is not fixed, suppose that
we first calculate the form of |B(c)〉 by assuming that the
fake result |p′′i , q′′i 〉β for βi is a type a lie when i = 1, and
it is a type c lie when i = 2, ... , then we calculate the
form of |B(c∗)〉 corresponding to a different codeword c∗
by assuming that the fake result for βi is a type b lie
when i = 1, and it is an honest result when i = 2, ... In
this case, for any given i, we cannot guarantee that ci
and c∗i are corresponding to the same type of lies. So we
can no longer make the assertion above Eq. (12), that
“among the d different bits between any two codewords,
there is at least one bit that corresponding to a type
a or b lie”, even if we take d > h + l′c. Consequently,
〈B(c) |B(c∗)〉 = 0 will not necessarily hold, especially
when we exhausts all possible combinations of the types
of lies. In turns, ρB0 ⊥ ρB1 will become invalid. Also, there
will be some codewords that lead to 〈B(c) |B(c∗)〉 6= 0,
even if c ⊙ r = 0 while c∗ ⊙ r = 1. Then although Eq.
(13) sums over all c satisfying c⊙r = 0 only, the operator
P0 thus obtained will actually contains components like
|B(c∗)〉 〈B(c∗)| where c∗⊙r = 1. Applying such a P0 will
no longer provide the value of b, no matter the projection
is successful or not.
Thus we show that to construct the projection opera-
tor for the measurement to distinguish ρBb , Bob needs to
know the type of lies corresponding to every βi first. But
as we know, the types of lies are defined according to the
comparison between Bob’s announced |p′′i , q′′i 〉β and his
actual result |p′i, q′i〉β . Consequently, it brings an impor-
tant feature to our protocol, that even Bob himself does
not know the type of lies corresponding to each i if he
has not performed any measurement to obtain |p′i, q′i〉β
yet. To know this information, Bob is forced to measure
the quantum system at his side. But when he did, the
state is collapsed in the measurement, so that it is impos-
sible to further perform measurement in another basis to
obtain additional information.
Let us elaborate this in more details. Remind that
the type a lie is defined as |p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |p′i, qq′i〉β . To
identify whether an announced |p′′i , q′′i 〉β is a type a lie,
Bob has to measure βi in the basis p
′
i = p
′′
i . But for a
type a lie, the two states of βi corresponding to c
0
i = 0
and c0i = 1, respectively, are |qp′′i , q′′i 〉β & |qp′′i , qq′′i 〉β .
To distinguish the two states, the required measurement
should be performed in the qp′′i basis, which is different
from p′i. As the two measurements are not commuta-
tive, even if Bob delays his measurement during the com-
mit phase, later when he wants to decode the committed
bit b without Alice’s helping, he will face the dilemma
which basis to use for his measurement. To know how
the states of βi corresponding to c
0
i = 0 and c
0
i = 1
are defined for each i, he needs to identify the type of
lies first. But once he measured βi in the p
′′
i basis and
found that it is corresponding to a type a lie, then he
lost the chance to perform the measurement in the qp′′i
basis for identifying c0i . In this case, he can no longer
know the form of the state |B(c)〉, nor the density ma-
trix ρBb =
∑
c∈C|c⊙r=b λc |B(c)〉 〈B(c)|. Consequently, he
will not know how to construct P0 in Eq. (13) or any
other measurement to decode Alice’s committed b. This
is also the case for type c lies and honest results, because
there does not exist a single basis that can distinguish
the type of lies and the value of c0i simultaneously.
In short, though there is ρB0 ⊥ ρB1 when Eq. (12)
is satisfied, constructing the measurement operator for
distinguishing ρBb requires the knowledge on how ρ
B
b are
defined. But when there are types a and c lies and honest
results, the definition of ρBb is unknown to Bob unless he
performs another measurement to identify the types of
lies. As the two measurements are not commutative, Bob
cannot have the best of both worlds. The only exception,
however, is type b lies, which will be studied below.
B. Alice’s required d
Unlike other types of lies and honest results, once a
type b lie is identified, the value of c0i will be known to
Bob automatically without requiring another measure-
ment. As shown in Table I, there is no legitimate state
of βi that can be unveiled as c
0
i = 1. If Bob announced a
fake result |p′′i , q′′i 〉β as a type b lie, i.e. his measurement
was performed in the qp′′i basis and the actual result is
|p′i, q′i〉β = |qp′′i , q′′i 〉β, Bob will know that there must be
c0i = 0 once Alice has not announced this |p′′i , q′′i 〉β as
a detected lie in step (C4). No need for a further mea-
surement in a different basis. Therefore Bob would like
to maximize the number of the type b lies, to save him-
self from the dilemma brought by types a and c lies and
honest results. When the type b lies occur with a suffi-
ciently high frequency fb so that there is l
′
b > n−d, then
he knows more than n − d bits of the codeword Alice
chose. Here l′b is the number of the type b lies remained
undetected in the commit phase, as presented in Eq. (9).
Since the distance between any two codewords is not less
than d, there will be only one codeword in C which con-
tains these bits known to Bob. Thus he can deduce the
rest unknown bits, and learn the complete codeword so
that the value of Alice’s committed bit b can be deduced.
However, this can be avoided by setting an upperbound
for d. Although Alice does not know the respective values
of fa, fb, and fc that Bob chose, in step (C4) she knows
|M |, i.e., Eq. (5). Suppose that in step (C7.1) Alice
accepts a value of d that satisfies
d < dmax ≡ m− s/4 ≃ (fa + fc)s/2
≤ fas/2 + 3fcs/4 = l′a + l′c. (14)
That is, d is smaller than the total of types a and c lies
that remain undetected after the commit phase. In this
case, among any n − d bits of the codeword, there will
always be at least one bit that corresponds to a type a
or c lie, i.e., l′b > n− d will never be satisfied. Then Bob
will not have enough type b lies to deduce the complete
8codeword, because with more than d bits remained un-
known, the possible choices for codewords will increase
exponentially with the value of k of the (n, k, d)-code C.
As a result, once Eq. (14) is met, the protocol is conceal-
ing no matter how Bob chooses his lying frequencies fa,
fb, and fc.
C. The existence of d
So we can see that in step (C7.1) of the commit pro-
tocol, for their own benefit, Alice will try to lower the
value of d so that Eq. (14) can be satisfied, while Bob
will try to increase d to meet Eq. (12). Luckily we can
have the best of both worlds. Since
dmax − dmin = (m− s/4)− (h+ l′c)
= (3fa/2 + fb + 3fc/4− 1)s, (15)
there will be dmax > dmin when
3fa/2 + fb + 3fc/4 > 1, (16)
so that there can be a value of d between dmax and dmin
that both Alice and Bob are willing to accept. Although
the above values are estimated statistically and subjected
to fluctuations, when s is very large there will be enough
gap between dmax and dmin for Alice and Bob to choose
a proper d.
The condition Eq. (16) can be met easily. For example,
a simple choice is that Bob takes fb > 1 − 3fa/2 and
fc = 0 (in fact any fc satisfying 0 ≤ fc < 1− fa− fb will
do) in step (C3). Note that even if Bob does not choose
these values honestly, Alice does not need to worry. All
she need is to insist on choosing a value of d that satisfies
Eq. (14) in step (C7.1), which is a legitimate action for
an honest Alice that Bob cannot refuse. In this case she
can still be sure that Bob does not have enough type b
lies to deduce the codeword. Meanwhile, if the dishonest
Bob accepts such a value of d in order to avoid Alice
feeling suspicious, then Eq. (12) may not be satisfied, In
this case ρB0 ⊥ ρB1 will no longer be ensured, which may
leave room for Alice’s potential cheating. Thus we see
that if Bob does not choose fa, fb, and fc following Eq.
(16) honestly, then he can only hurt his own benefit.
VI. SUMMARY AND REMARKS
We show above that our protocol satisfies ρB0 ⊥ ρB1
when Eq. (12) is met. Therefore Alice cannot cheat with
the specific strategy presented in existing no-go proofs
of unconditionally secure QBC. The key reason is that
all these proofs are based on the HJW theorem, which
requires ρB0 ≃ ρB1 .
On the other hand, our protocol remains secure against
Bob’s cheating when Eq. (14) is met, because the mea-
surement basis for the discrimination between ρB0 and ρ
B
1
is different from the basis for learning the definition of ρB0
and ρB1 . Thus we see that ρ
B
0 ≃ ρB1 is not a necessary
condition for a QBC protocol to be concealing.
Also, Eq. (16) ensures that Eqs. (12) and (14) can
be satisfied simultaneously, so that the security against
both sides can be guaranteed.
It is worth noting that ρB0 ⊥ ρB1 actually can also
be found in some unconditionally secure relativistic bit
commitment protocols [35, 36], where the committed val-
ues are encoded with classical data instead of quantum
states. As pointed out in the 3rd paragraph of the in-
troduction of [15], “Kent’s relativistic bit commitment
protocol does not rely on the existence of alternative de-
compositions of a density operator, and so its security
is not challenged by the Mayers-Lo-Chau result.” They
make use of relativistic constraints to achieve the security
against Bob’s cheating. Another previous QBC proposal
of ours [25] have the feature ρB0 ⊥ ρB1 too, as it is built
on top of a quantum key distribution scheme based on
orthogonal states [37]. Whether relativity is the key of
its security is arguable [38, 39]. Our current protocol is
completely free from the need of relativity. Its security
against Bob is provided by keeping the definition of ρBb
secret from him at the beginning.
The fact that ρBb is unknown without measurement is
also an interesting feature that sets our protocol apart
from the QBC model studied in many no-go proofs. In
the own words of [3] (as stated below its Eq. (2)), “both
Alice and Bob are supposed to know the states |0〉 and
|1〉. This implies, in particular, that both of them know
the states |φi〉B and
∣∣φ′j〉B”. Here |0〉 (|1〉) and |φi〉B
(
∣∣φ′j〉B) have the same meanings as these of |ψb〉 and∣∣∣f (b)j
〉
B
(b = 0, 1) in our Eq. (1). In many other no-go
proofs, though it is not explicitly stated, we can still see
from the details of their proofs that they hold the same
viewpoint. But as already pinpointed out in another no-
go proof [17, 18], previously “the no-go theorem asserts
(this) without proof”, and “this assertion is actually not
meaningful”. (An amendment to this problem was made
in [17, 18]. But it only considered the case where the
states are unknown to Alice, instead of Bob, and the
proof is still based on ρB0 ≃ ρB1 .)
These findings reveal that the existing impossibility
proofs are not sufficiently general. If unconditionally se-
cure QBC is indeed impossible, then it is necessary to
show that there exists a more universal cheating strategy
which does not rely on the condition ρB0 ≃ ρB1 .
Finally, it is worth noting that entanglement plays an
essential role in our protocol. In many previous QBC
protocols proven insecure by the no-go theorem, the hon-
est participants can execute the protocol successfully by
exchanging pure states unentangled with any system at
their sides. Entanglement is needed only when cheating.
On the contrary, in our protocol even an honest Alice
must make use of entangled states to accomplish the op-
timal strategy to detect Bob’s lies. If she prepares every
βi as a pure state |pi, qi〉β instead, and sends it to Bob
without entangling it with any system at her side, then
9she cannot detect the lies with the efficiency required in
the protocol. Therefore such an Alice will be caught as
cheating instead of honest. That is, our protocol cannot
be accomplished without entanglement. Since entangle-
ment is a typical example of nonlocality, this result is
consistent with the claim that nonlocality is necessary
for secure QBC, as shown in section 7 of [25], as well as
in [40].
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